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THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEM; A STOCHASTIC MAXIMUM
PRINCIPLE APPROACH
BOUALEMDJEHICHE AND PETER HELGESSON
ABSTRACT. We study a general class of Principal-Agent problems in continuous
time under hidden action. By formulating the model as a coupled stochastic opti-
mal control problemwe are able to find a set of necessary conditions characterizing
optimal contracts, using the stochastic maximum principle. An example is carried
out to illustrate the proposed approach to the Principal-Agent problem under lin-
ear stochastic dynamics with a quadratic performance function.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Providing incentives between parts in a shared economic environment is fun-
damental in any modern society. Important examples arise for instance in wage
negotiations between employer and employee, terms of insurance between insur-
ance company and client and in contract formation between shareholder and port-
folio manager. In the economics literature these problems are known as Principal-
Agent problems, all having the common feature that a principal hires an agent to
work in a certain project, possibly under moral-hazard, and wishes to find an op-
timal way of providing incentives. In this paper we present a general approach
for characterizing such optimal contracts when the action of the agent is hidden
information (i.e. moral-hazard) and incentives are delivered continuously in time.
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The precise structure of the Principal-Agent problem goes as follows: The prin-
cipal employs the agent to manage a certain well-defined noisy asset over a fixed
period of time. For his/her efforts the agent receives a compensation according to
some agreement, set before the period starts. It could for instance involve a lump-
sum payment at the end of the period, a continuously paying cash-flow during the
period, or both. Depending on what information the principle has at hand to form
such an agreement, one distinguishes between two distinct cases; the Full Infor-
mation- and the Hidden Action-problem. The full information case differs from the
hidden action case in that the principal can observe the actions of the agent in ad-
dition to the evolution of the asset. Therefore, under full information the principal
is allowed to tailor a contract based on both outcome and effort, not only outcome
as for hidden actions. In both cases the contract is constrained by the agent via a so
called participation constraint, clarifying the minimum requirements of the agent to
engage in the project. Under hidden action the contract is further constrained by
the incentive compatibility condition, meaning that as soon as a contract is assigned
the agent will act as to maximize his/her own utility and not necessarily that of
the principal.
The first paper in which a continuous time version of the Principal-Agent prob-
lem appears is [HM87] by Holmstro¨m and Milgrom. They consider a model in
which the agent takes action in continuous time over a finite period and gets re-
warded by the principal at the end of this period. In particular, for exponential
utility functions they prove the optimal contract to be linear with respect to the
output. In 1993 Scha¨tter and Sung [SS93] generalized this seminal paper by sug-
gesting a general mathematical framework based on the dynamic programming
principle and martingale methods to characterize implementable contracts for a
rich class of continuous time models, still though involving lump-sum payments.
In recent years the interest in continuous time versions of the Principal-Agent
problem has flourished, mainly because of the available mathematical machinery
that offers tractable ways to resolve technical difficulties in discrete time models.
The literature has therefore grown substantially, with contributions from many
authors, including Cvitanic´, Wan and Zhang [CWZ09], Sannikov [San08], Wester-
field [Wes06] and Williams [Wil13]. A thorough presentation of the field (with an
emphasis on the mathematical aspects that arise) can be found in the book [CZ13]
by Cvitanic´ and Zhang.
In the present literature the paper closest to ours is [Wil13]. The aim of that
article is to characterize optimal contracts as continuously paying cash-flows in a
very general setting, both in full information and under hidden action (with the
additional possibility to involve hidden savings of the agent). His idea is to attack
the problem by applying the stochastic maximum principle suggested in Bismut
[Bis78]. An explicit example is constructed as a fully dynamical analogue of the
exponential utility model by Holmstro¨m and Milgrom, and is solved by using
methods involving the dynamical programming principle and the HJB-equation.
The book [CZ13] by Cvitanic´ and Zhang has a similar approach, covering a very
general class of Principal-Agent problems (involving both lump-sum payments
and cash-flows) and using techniques from stochastic optimal control, including
martingale methods.
Our goal is to study a general stochastic and fully dynamical Principal-Agent
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problem under hidden actions by applying generalizations of Pontryagin’s maxi-
mumprinciple. The idea is to first consider the Agent’s problem (assuming a given
continuously paying cash-flow as an adapted stochastic process) and characterize
the optimal effort. By incentive compatibility we then proceed to the Principal’s
problem which becomes a state constrained optimal control problem for which
we characterize cash-flow optimality. Following that scheme we end up with a
coupled pair of stochastic optimization problems. The key required to set up the
Principal-Agent problem in this way is (as also pointed out by Yong in [Yon10])
access to fundamental results concerning existence and uniqueness of solutions to
forward-backward stochastic differential equations (from now on FBSDEs). The
theory of FBSDEs is far from complete but well established in the stochastic anal-
ysis literature (see e.g. [Del02], [MPY94], [MY99], [PW99], [Zha06], [Wu98]) and
constrained optimal control of such equations has been studied for instance in
Ji and Zhou [JZ06] and Ji and Wei [JW13]. The reason to approach the problem
by means of the stochastic maximum principle is twofold: Firstly, the method is
versatile and does not rely on the dynamic programming principle which opens
up the possibility to study models where the HJB-equation does not apply, such
as non-Markovian dynamics and performance functionals of mean-field type, in-
cluding risk measures such as the variance. Secondly, it is possible to extend the
maximumprinciple to include state constrained problemswithout adding any sig-
nificant difficulty. It is therefore suitable for explicit calculation.
Comparing our approach to what is done in [Wil13] we are able to state a full
characterization of optimality of the Principal-Agent problem (i.e. characterizing
optimal controls of both the agent and the principal satisfying the participation
constraint) whereas Williams only solves the Agent’s problem. We further believe
that our method is simpler to overview and more accessible. Our contribution to
the existing literature should be regarded asmathematical rather than economical.
We present a general framework for solving a class of Principal-Agent problems,
without claiming or investigating possible consequences in economy. The main
results of our study are presented in Theorem 3.5 and Theorem 3.8 in which full
characterizations of optimal contracts is stated for two different models.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we present mathematical results
from stochastic optimal control that are required for our purposes. Section 3 is
devoted to formulating the classes of Principal-Agent problems under study and
to characterize optimal contracts by means of the results in Section 2. In Section 4
we make the general approach of the previous sections concrete by a fully solved
example in the linear-quadratic (LQ)-setting. As a numerical result we find an in-
teresting and rather counterintuitive behavior of the optimal contract, suggesting
a ”win-win” relation between the principal and the agent. Finally, in Section 5 we
briefly discuss what we have chosen to call A View Towards Hidden Actions in the
Strong Formulation, meaning that the principal proposes a cash-flow to the agent
explicitly given as a Markovian (or feedback type) function of output. By a simple
example it becomes clear that this case is muchmore difficult to handle and it does
not quite fit into the present framework.
2. PRELIMINARIES
Let T > 0 be a fixed time horizon and (Ω,F ,F,P) be a filtered probability space
satisfying the usual conditions, on which a d-dimensional Brownian motion W =
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{Wt}t≥0 is defined. We let F be the natural filtration generated byW, augmented
by all P-null sets NP, i.e. F = Ft ∨NP where Ft := σ({Ws} : 0 ≤ s ≤ t).
Consider the following control system:{
dx(t) = b(t, x(t), u(t))dt+ σ(t, x(t))dWt, t ∈ (0, T]
x(0) = x0
with a cost functional of the form
J (u(·)) := E
[∫ T
0
f (t, x(t), u(t))dt+ h(x(T))
]
. (2.1)
In the most general setting we assume that b : [0, T]×Rn ×U → Rn, σ : [0, T]×
R
n → Rn×d, f : [0, T]×Rn ×U → R and h : R → R where

b(t, x, u) :=


b1(t, x, u)
...
bn(t, x, u)


σ(t, x) := (σ1(t, x), . . . , σd(t, x))
σj(t, x) :=


σ1j(t, x)
...
σnj(t, x)

 , 1 ≤ j ≤ d
We require the following assumptions to hold:
(S1): (U, d) is a separable metric space.
(S2): The maps b, σ, f and h are measurable and there exists a constant L > 0
and a modulus of continuity ω¯ : [0,∞) → [0,∞) such that for ϕ(t, x, u) =
b(t, x, u), σ(t, x, u), f (t, x, u), h(x) it holds that

|ϕ(t, x, u)− ϕ(t, xˆ, uˆ)| ≤ L|x − xˆ|+ ω¯(d(u, uˆ)),
∀t ∈ [0, T], x, xˆ ∈ Rn, u, uˆ ∈ U
|ϕ(t, 0, u)| ≤ L, ∀(t, u) ∈ [0, T]×U
(S3): The maps b, σ, f and h are C1 in x. Moreover there exists a constant
L > 0 and a modulus of continuity ω¯ : [0,∞) → [0,∞) such that for
ϕ(t, x, u) = b(t, x, u), σ(t, x, u), f (t, x, u), h(x) it holds that{ |ϕx(t, x, u)− ϕx(t, xˆ, uˆ)| ≤ L|x− xˆ|+ ω¯(d(u, uˆ)),
∀t ∈ [0, T], x, xˆ ∈ Rn, u, uˆ ∈ U
Finally we define the space of admissible controls as
U [0, T] := {u : [0, T]×Ω → U; u is {Ft}t≥0-adapted}
and formulate our optimal control problem:
Problem (S): Minimize (2.1) over U [0, T].
Any u¯(·) ∈ U [0, T] satisfying
J (u¯(·)) = inf
u(·)∈U [0,T]
J (u(·))
is called an optimal control and the corresponding x¯(·) is called the optimal state
process. We will refer to (x¯(·), u¯(·)) as an optimal pair. We are now ready to state
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the celebrated stochastic maximum principle, providing necessary conditions for
optimality in problem (S).
Theorem 2.1 (The Stochastic Maximum Principle). Let the regularity conditions in
(S1)-(S3) hold and consider an optimal pair (x¯(·), u¯(·)) of problem (S). Then there ex-
ists a pair of processes (p(·), q(·)) ∈ L2F (0, T;Rn) × (L2F (0, T;Rn))d, where q(·) :=
(q1(·), . . . , qd(·)), satisfying the adjoint equation

dp(t) = −
{
bx(t, x¯(t), u¯(t))p(t) + ∑
d
j=1 σ
j
x(t, x¯(t))
⊤q(t)j − fx(t, x¯(t), u¯(t))
}
dt
+q(t)dWt,
p(T) = −hx(x¯(T)),
(2.2)
such that
u¯(t) = argmax
u∈U
H(t, x¯(t), u, p(t), q(t)), a.e. t ∈ [0, T], P-a.s. (2.3)
where the Hamiltonian functionH is given by
H(t, x, u, p, q) := 〈p, b(t, x, u)〉+ tr
[
q⊤σ(t, x, u)
]
− f (t, x, u) (2.4)
for (t, x, u, p, q) ∈ [0, T]×Rn ×U ×Rn ×Rn×d.
Remark 2.2. It is important to remember that Theorem 2.1 merely states a set of
necessary conditions for optimality in (S). It does not claim the existence of such.
Existence of stochastic optimal controls (both in the strong and the weak sense) has
been a subject of study since the sixties (see e.g. [Kus65]) and, at least for strong
solutions, the results seem to depend a lot upon the statement of the problem. In
the weak sense, an account of existence results is to be found in [YZ99] (Theorem
5.3, p. 71).
Remark 2.3. Restricting the space U to be convex allows for a controlled diffusion
coefficient σ(t, x, u), without changing the conclusion of Theorem 2.1. In the case
of a non-convex control space the stochastic maximum principle with controlled
diffusion was proven in [Pen90] and requires a solution (P,Q) of an additional
adjoint BSDE. We choose to leave this most general form as reference in order to
keep the presentation clear.
As pointed out in Remark 2.2 it is a non-trivial task to prove the existence of
an optimal pair (x¯(·), u¯(·)) in a general stochastic control model. Under the addi-
tional assumptions
(S4): The control domain U is a convex body in Rk. The maps b, σ and f are
locally Lipschitz in u and their derivatives in x are continuous in (x, u),
the following theorem provides sufficient conditions for optimality in (S).
Theorem 2.4 (Sufficient Conditions for Optimality). Assume conditions (S1)-(S4)
and let (x¯(·), u¯(·), p(·), q(·)) be an admissible 4-tuple. Suppose that h(·) is convex,
H(t, ·, ·, p(t), q(t)) is concave for all t ∈ [0, T] P-a.s. and
u¯(t) = argmax
u∈U
H(t, x¯(t), u, p(t), q(t)), a.e. t ∈ [0, T], P-a.s.
Then (x¯(·), u¯(·)) is an optimal pair for problem (S).
For the sake of simplicity, from now on we will only consider the case d = 1 and
assume the functions b, σ, f to be R-valued. We will also restrict our selves to
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consider the case in which U ⊆ R, equipped with the usual Euclidean metric.
The stochastic maximum principle has since the early days of the subject (in
pioneering papers by e.g. Bismut and Bensoussan in [Bis78] and [Ben82]) devel-
oped a lot and do by now apply to a wide range of problems more general than
(S) (see for instance [Pen90], [AD11] [BDL11], [DTT14], to mention a few). For our
purposes it will be necessary to have a refined version of Theorem 2.1, characteriz-
ing optimal controls in a FBSDE-dynamical setting under state constraints. More
precisely we wish to consider a stochastically controlled system of the form

dx(t) = b(t, x(t), y(t), z(t), u(t))dt+ σ(t, x(t), y(t), z(t))dWt
dy(t) = −c(t, x(t), y(t), z(t), u(t))dt+ z(t)dWt
x(0) = x0, y(T) = ϕ(x(T)),
(2.5)
with respect to a cost-functional
J (u(·)) := E
[∫ T
0
f (t, x(t), y(t), z(t), u(t))dt+ h(x(T)) + g(y(0))
]
, (2.6)
but also with respect to a set of state constraints
E
[∫ T
0 F(t, x(t), y(t), z(t), u(t))dt+ H(x(T)) + G(y(0))
]
:=


E
[∫ T
0 f
1(t, x(t), y(t), z(t), u(t))dt+ h1(x(T)) + g1(y(0))
]
...
E
[∫ T
0 f
l(t, x(t), y(t), z(t), u(t))dt+ hl(x(T)) + gl(y(0))
]

 ∈ Λ,
(2.7)
for some closed and convex set Λ ⊆ Rl . The optimal control problem is:
Problem (SC): Minimize (2.6) subject to the state constraints (2.7) over the
set U [0, T].
To get a good maximum principle for (SC) we require some further regularity con-
ditions ensuring solvability of (2.5). These conditions, denoted by (SC1)-(SC3) are
stated below and can be found in [SW06]. All coefficient functions, and hence all
x(·), y(·), z(·), are considered to be real valued.
Let G ∈ R\{0} and introduce the following notation:
v =

 xy
z

 , A(t, v) =

 −G fGb
Gσ

 (t, v).
We assume the existence of a nonzero constant G so that:
(SC1):


(i) A(t, v) is uniformly Lipschitz with respect to v
(ii) A(t, v) ∈ L2F (Ω;C([0, T];R))× L2F (Ω;C([0, T];R))× L2F (0, T;R)
for each v ∈ R3
(iii) ϕ(x) is uniformly Lipschitz with respect to x ∈ R
(iv) ϕ(x) ∈ L2(Ω,FT,P;R) for x ∈ R
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(SC2):


〈A(t, v)− A(t, v˜), v− v˜〉 ≤ −β1|G(x− x˜)|2
−β2(|G(y− y˜)|2 + |G(z− z˜)|2),
〈ϕ(x)− ϕ(x˜), L(x− x˜)〉 ≥ µ|G(x− x˜)|2,
where β1, β2, µ are nonnegative constants with β1 + β2 > 0, β2 + µ > 0.
Conditions (SC1) and (SC2) were first introduced in [PW99] to study existence and
uniqueness of fully coupled FBSDEs. The monotonicity property (SC2) is some-
times called G-monotonicity of A(t, v). We further assume that:
(SC3):


(i) b, σ, c, ϕ, f , h, g are continuously differentiable.
(ii) The derivatives of b, σ, c, ϕ are bounded.
(iii) The derivatives of f are bounded by C(1+ |x|+ |y|+ |z|+ |u|).
(iv) The derivatives of h and g are bounded by C(1+ |x|)
and C(1+ |y|), respectively.
For convenience, we will use the following notation throughout the paper. For
φ ∈ {b, σ, c, f , h}, etc, we define,


δφ(t) = φ(t, x¯(t), y¯(t), z¯(t), u(t))− φ(t, x¯(t), y¯(t), z¯(t), u¯(t));
φw(t) =
∂φ
∂w (t, x¯(t), y¯(t), z¯(t), u¯(t)), w = x, y, z;
φxx(t) =
∂2φ
∂x2
(t, x¯(t), y¯(t), z¯(t), u¯(t)).
(2.8)
whenever, (x¯(·), y¯(·), z¯(·), u¯(·)) is an optimal 4-tuple of problem (SC), where u is
an admissible control.
We are now ready to formulate the state constrained stochastic maximum prin-
ciple for fully coupled FBSDEs.
Theorem 2.5 (The State Constrained Maximum Principle for a FBSDE-system).
Let the regularity conditions in (SC1)-(SC3) hold and assume Λ ⊆ Rl to be a closed
and convex set. If (x¯(·), y¯(·), z¯(·), u¯(·)) is an optimal 4-tuple of problem (SC), then there
exists a vector (λ0, λ) ∈ R1+l such that
λ0 ≥ 0, |λ0|2 + |λ|2 = 1, (2.9)
satisfying the transversality condition
〈λ, v−E
[∫ T
0
F(t, x¯(t), y¯(t), z¯(t), u¯(t))dt+ H(x¯(T)) + G(y¯(0))
]
〉 ≥ 0, ∀v ∈ Λ
(2.10)
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and a 3-tuple (r(·), p(·), q(·)) ∈ L2F (Ω;C([0, T];R))× L2F(Ω;C([0, T];R))× L2F(0, T;R)
of solutions to the adjoint FBSDE

dr(t) =
{
cy(t)r(t)− by(t)p(t)− σy(t)q(t) + ∑li=0 λi f iy(t)
}
dt+
+
{
cz(t)r(t)− bz(t)p(t)− σz(t)q(t) + ∑li=0 λi f iz(t)
}
dWt,
dp(t) = −
{
−cx(t)r(t) + bx(t)p(t) + σx(t)q(t)−∑li=0 λi f ix(t)
}
dt+ q(t)dWt,
r(0) = ∑li=0 λiE[g
i(y¯(0))], p(T) = −ϕx(x¯(T))r(T)−∑li=0 λihix(x¯(T)),
(2.11)
such that
u¯(t) = argmax
u∈U
H(t, x¯(t), y¯(t), z¯(t), u, r(t), p(t), q(t), λ0, λ) a.e. t ∈ [0, T], P-a.s.
where the Hamiltonian functionH is given by
H(t, x, y, z, u, r, p, q, λ0, λ) :=
〈r,−c(t, x, y, z, u)〉+ 〈p, b(t, x, y, z, u)〉+ qσ(t, x, y, z)−∑li=0 λi f i(t, x, y, z, u).
A maximumprinciple of FBSDEs similar to the above has been studied in [JZ06]
and [JW13], though under so called terminal state constraints. To the best of our
knowledge the proof of Theorem 2.5 is not in the literature, but the arguments
closely follow those in the proof of an analogue theorem for controlling SDEs
rather than FBSDEs. For the sake of completeness we present the full proof, yet
pointing out the close overlap with a similar theorem in [YZ99] (Theorem 6.1, p.
144). Some necessary but technical results that are required are presented in Ap-
pendix A.
Proof. First we introduce the notation:
x(T) :=
∫ T
0
F(t, x(t), y(t), z(t), u(t))dt+ H(x(T)) + G(y(0)).
By adding a proper constant to the cost functional we may without loss of gener-
ality assume that J (u¯(·)) = 0. For any ρ > 0 define
Jρ(u¯(·)) := {[(J (u¯(·)) + ρ)+]2 + dΛ(Ex(T))2}1/2
where dΛ is the metric measuring the distance from any point in R
l to the closed
and convex set Λ, i.e.
dΛ(v) := inf
v′∈Λ
|v− v′|, ∀v ∈ Rl .
By the fact that (U [0, T], d¯) is a complete metric space when
d¯(u(·), u˜(·)) := |{(t,ω) ∈ [0, T]×Ω : u(t,ω) 6= u˜(t,ω)}|, ∀u(·), u˜(·) ∈ U [0, T],
(see Lemma A.3) Ekeland’s variational principle (Corollary A.2) applied to Jρ en-
sures the existence of a uρ(·) ∈ U [0, T] being optimal to the problem of controlling
(2.5) with respect to the cost functional Jρ(u(·)) +√ρd¯(uρ(·), u(·)). Furthermore
it holds (also by Ekeland’s principle) that d¯(uρ(·), u¯(·)) ≤ ρ so the control uρ(·)
is close to the state constrained optimal control u¯(·). The idea is now to derive
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necessary conditions for optimality of uρ(·) and then let ρ→ 0.
Fix a ρ > 0 and a u(·) ∈ U [0, T] and consider the spike variation
uερ(t) :=
{
uρ(t), t ∈ [0, T]\Eε,
u(t), t ∈ Eε,
for any given ε > 0 and Borel measurable set Eε ⊆ [0, T] with |Eε| = ε. Clearly
d¯(uερ(·), uρ(·)) ≤ |Eε ×Ω| = ε so by the optimality of uρ(·) and a Taylor expansion
we get
−√ρε ≤ Jρ(uερ(·))−Jρ(uρ(·)) =
= λ0,ερ (J (uερ(·))−J (uρ(·))) + 〈λερ,E[xερ(T)− xρ(T)]〉 =
= E
[
∑
l
i=0 λ
i,ε
ρ
{∫ T
0 f
i(t, xερ(t), y
ε
ρ(t), z
ε
ρ(t), u
ε
ρ(t))− f i(t, xρ(t), yρ(t), zρ(t), uρ(t))dt
+(hi(xερ(T))− hi(xρ(T))) + (gi(yερ(0))− gi(yρ(0)))
}]
(2.12)
where the linear approximation factors are
λ0,ερ :=
[J (uρ(·)) + ρ]+
Jρ(uρ(·)) + o(1), (2.13)
λερ :=
dΛ(E[xρ(T)])∂dΛ(E[xρ(T)])
Jρ(uρ(·)) + o(1), (2.14)
and λερ = (λ
1,ε
ρ , ..., λ
l,ε
ρ ). By the variational inequality in [SW06] (Lemma 3.5, p.
163) we get that the inequality in (2.12) can be estimated further so that
−√ρε ≤ E
[
∑
l
i=0 λ
i,ε
ρ
{∫ T
0 f
i
x(t)x˜
ε
ρ(t) + f
i
y(t)y˜
ε
ρ(t) + f
i
z(t)z˜
ε
ρ(t) + δ f
i(t)χEε(t)dt
+hix(xρ(T))x˜
ε
ρ(T) + g
i
y(yρ(0))y˜
ε
ρ(0)
}]
+ o(ε),
where the processes x˜ερ, y˜
ε
ρ, z˜
ε
ρ solve the variational FBSDE-system:

dx˜ερ(t) = (bx(t)x˜
ε
ρ(t) + by(t)y˜
ε
ρ(t) + bz(t)z˜
ε
ρ(t) + δb(t)χEε(t))dt
+(σx(t)x˜ερ(t) + σy(t)y˜
ε
ρ(t) + σz(t)z˜
ε
ρ(t))dWt,
dy˜ερ(t) = −( fx(t)x˜ερ(t) + fy(t)y˜ερ(t) + fz(t)z˜ερ(t) + δ f (t)χEε(t))dt+ z˜ερ(t)dWt
x˜ερ(0) = 0, y˜
ε
ρ(T) = ϕx(x
ε
ρ(T))x˜
ε
ρ(T).
Consider the following adjoint equations:

drερ(t) =
[
cy(t)rερ(t)− by(t)pερ(t)− σy(t)qερ(t)−∑li=0 λi,ερ f iy(t)
]
dt
+
[
cz(t)rερ(t)− bz(t)pερ(t)− σz(t)qερ(t)−∑li=0 λi,ερ f iz(t)
]
dWt
dpερ(t) = −
[
cx(t)rερ(t)− bx(t)pερ(t)− σx(t)qερ(t)−∑li=0 λi,ερ f ix(t)
]
dt+ qερ(t)dWt
rερ(0) = −E
[
∑
l
i=0 λ
i,ε
ρ g
i(y(0))
]
, pερ(T) = −ϕx(x(T))rερ(T) + ∑li=0 λi,ερ hix(x(T))
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By the duality relation in [SW06] (in the proof of Theorem 4.1, p. 168) we then get
that
E
[∫ T
0
δHρχEε(t)dt
]
≤ √ρε+ o(ε)
where the hamiltonian Hρ is
Hρ(t, x, y, z, u, r, p, q, λ0,ερ , λερ) = p · b− r · c+ q · σ−
l
∑
i=0
λi,ερ f
i,
and further, by (2.13) and (2.14) and a property of Clarke’s generalized gradient
∂dΛ (see Lemma A.4), there exists a choice of multipliers (λ
0,ε
ρ , λ
1,ε
ρ , . . . , λ
l,ε
ρ ) such
that
λ0,ερ ≥ o(1), |λ0,ερ |2 + |λερ|2 = 1+ o(1).
Thus, there is a subsequence, still denoted by (λ0,ερ , λ
ε
ρ), such that
lim
ε→0(λ
0,ε
ρ , λ
ε
ρ) = (λ
0
ρ, λρ)
for some (λ0ρ, λρ) ∈ R1+l such that
λ0ρ ≥ 0, |λ0ρ|2 + |λρ|2 = 1.
Furthermore, by [Wu98], we have strong convergence in L2F (Ω;C([0, T];R)) ×
L2F (Ω;C([0, T];R))× L2F (0, T;R) of (adapted) solutions to the FBSDEs:
(rǫρ(·), pǫρ(·), qǫρ(·))→ (rρ(·), pρ(·), qρ(·)).
For the limit properties of the hamiltonian, let Eε = [t¯, t¯ + ε] for an arbitrary t¯ ∈
[0, T] and let A be an arbitrary set in Ft¯ and consider the control u(t) = v1A +
uρ(t)1Ω\A, for an arbitrary v ∈ U in (2). Dividing (2) by ε and then approaching
the limit ε→ 0 yields
√
ρ ≥ Hρ(t, x(t), y(t), z(t), u(t), r(t), p(t), q(t),λ0,ερ , λερ)
−Hρ(t, x(t), y(t), z(t), uρ(t), r(t), p(t), q(t), λ0,ερ , λερ)
Finally, let ρ → 0. By choosing a subsequence and using (2) we may assume that
(λ0ρ, λρ) → (λ0, λ) ∈ R1+l for which (2.9) holds. Furthermore, by the fact that
d¯(uρ(·), u¯(·)) ≤ √ρ and the theorem on continuous dependence of a parameter
in FBSDEs in [Wu98] we have strong convergence of (rρ(·), pρ(·), qρ(·)) to a triple
(r(·), p(·), q(·)) satisfying (2.11). The transversality condition (2.10) follows in the
limit ε, ρ→ 0 from the definition of λερ and ∂dΛ(·) since then we have the inequal-
ity 〈λερ, v−E[xερ(T)]〉 ≥ −o(1), as ε → 0. 
Remark 2.6. As in Remark 2.3, analogue principles hold in Theorem 2.5.
3. THE PROBLEM
The present literature of Principal-Agent problems in continuous time covers
several different (although related) models. Basically two of these are fundamen-
tal and of particular interest; The Full Information case and the Hidden Action case.
In this section we develop a method of characterizing optimal contracts in the Hid-
den Action regime, based solely on the framework presented in Section 2.
The common setup of the Principal-Agent problem under Hidden Action is
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inspired by the seminal paper of Holmstro¨m-Milgrom (see [HM87]) and is well
treated, for instance, in [CZ13] and [Wil13]. Because of the considerable difficulty
arising in such models the usual approach is to state the problem in the weak form,
which is a mathematically related (but not equivalent) problem. The sole rea-
son for this mathematical difficulty lies at the heart of the problem formulation,
namely the asymmetric flow of information between the principal and the agent.
In what follows we first consider a model under Hidden Action deviating from
classical formulation by allowing the Principal to observe more information than
what is usually done (the full filtration generated by the noise). The advantage of
this being that we get a problem which is mathematically tractable in the strong
formulation, whereas the disadvantage is the immediate reduction of realism. We
will refer to this model as the Hidden Contract model. After this we explain how
the weak formulation of the classical Principal-Agent problem is contained in the
Hidden Contract framework. We end the section with a discussion of the models
and future prospects.
3.1. Hidden Contract in the strong formulation. Consider a Principal-Agentmodel
where output x(t) is modelled as a risky asset solving the SDE:{
dx(t) = f (t, x(t), e(t))dt+ σ(t, x(t))dWt, t ∈ (0, T],
x(0) = 0,
(3.1)
Here T > 0 and Wt is a 1-dimensional standard Brownian motion defined on the
filtered probability space (Ω,F ,F,P). The functions f and σ represent production
rate and volatility respectively, and we assume both of them satisfy the regular-
ity conditions (S2)-(S3) from the previous section. The process e(·) represents the
agent’s level of effort, taking values in some predefined subset E ⊆ R (typically
E = [0, eˆ] for some non-negative eˆ, or E = R) and is required to belong to E [0, T],
where
E [0, T] := {e : [0, T]×Ω → E; e is Ft-adapted}
We consider the case of Hidden Actions meaning that the principal cannot observe
the effort e(·). Output, however, is always public information and observed by
both the principal and the agent. In this model we relax the public information
structure to include also the Brownian noise, i.e. the filtration F rather than Fx ⊂
F. Thus, apart from the effort policy, the principal and the agent have access to the
same information. Before the period starts the principal specifies an F-adapted
cash-flow s(·) (typically non-negative) for all t ∈ [0, T], thus compensating the
agent for costly effort in managing x(·) and by that providing incentives. Just as
for the effort we assume s(t) ∈ S for all t ∈ [0, T] and some subset S ⊆ R and
require s(·) ∈ S [0, T], where
S [0, T] := {s : [0, T]×Ω → S; s is Ft-adapted}.
The principal is not constrained by any means and can, in principle, commit to
any process s(·) ∈ S [0, T].
In this model we consider cost functionals JP and JA of the principal and the
agent respectively of the following form:
JA(e(·); s) := E
[∫ T
0
u(t, x(t), e(t), s(t))dt+ v(x(t))
]
(3.2)
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and
JP(s(·)) := E
[∫ T
0
U (t, x(t), s(t))dt+ V(x(t))
]
. (3.3)
The agent will accept s(·) and start working for the principal only if it fulfills the
participation constraint:
JA(e¯(·); s) ≤ W0, (3.4)
for some, typically negative, constant W0. By assuming incentive compatibility,
meaning that the agent will act as to optimize JA in response to any given s(·), we
may think of the Principal-Agent problem as divided into two coupled problems;
The Agent’s problem and The Principal’s problem.
The Agent’s problem: Given any s(·) ∈ S [0, T] (which we assume do satisfy the
participation constraint (3.4)) the Agent’s problem is to find a process e¯(·) ∈ E [0, T]
such that
JA(e¯(·); s) = inf
e(·)∈E [0,T]
JA(e(·); s).
The Principal’s problem: Given that the Agent’s problem has an optimal solution
e¯(·) the Principal’s problem is to find a process s¯(·) ∈ S [0, T] such that
JP(s¯(·)) = inf
s(·)∈S [0,T]
JP(s(·))
and
JA(e¯(·); s¯) ≤ W0.
In this context the following definition is natural.
Definition 3.1. An optimal contract is a pair (e¯(·), s¯(·)) ∈ E [0, T]× S [0, T] obtained
by sequentially solving the Agent’s- and the Principal’s problem.
In the language of game theory an optimal contract can thus be thought of as a
Stackelberg-equilibrium in a two-player non-zero-sum game.
Remark 3.2. In the classical formulation of the problem the principal is only al-
lowed to write a contract based on his/her observation of output. Thus, rather
than being adapted to F the process s(·) must be adapted to the smaller filtra-
tion Fx. In that case the most general structure of a cash-flow is st = s(t, (x)t),
where (x)t denotes the history of output in the time interval [0, t]. The restriction
of having st adapted to Fx complicates the mathematical treatment in the strong
formulation and one has to consult the framework of weak solutions of SDEs. In
the above formulation of the model we do allow for a general cash-flow to be F-
adapted. Since the agent cannot control the noise he/she has no use of the precise
structure of s(·) and we may therefore regard it as hidden information, thus moti-
vating the nameHidden Contract. The agent influence the contract through 3.4 and
reacts to it by choosing optimal effort as the project starts.
For applications it is of course not realistic to assume a reasonable contract to
be purely F-adapted. However, as we develop the scheme of solving the Hidden
Contract model it becomes clear that many cases allow for Fx-adapted optimal
cash-flows s(·). This is in line with present literature in Full Information-models
(e.g. [CWZ06]) and motivates our approach.
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It is important to note that even though the principal cannot observe the agent’s
effort, he/she can still offer the agent a contract by suggesting a choice of effort
e(·) and a compensation s(·). However, by incentive compatibility the principal
knows that the agent will only follow such a contract if the suggested effort solves
the agent’s problem. In order to find the optimal suggested effort, e¯(·), the princi-
pal must therefore have information of the agent’s preferences, i.e. the functions u
and v. The realism of such an assumption is indeed questionable but nevertheless
necessary in our formulation due to the participation constraint. In order to make
the intuition clear and to avoid any confusion we adopt the convention that the
principal has full information of the agent’s preferences u and v. Of course, this
does not serve any mathematical purpose, it solely gives a tractable way of think-
ing of how actual contracting is realized.
Thus, the principal can predict any optimal effort e¯(·) of the agent’s problem
and by that suggest an optimal contract (e¯(·), s¯(·)), if it exists.
The idea is now to apply the methods from Section 2 to characterize optimal
contracts in the general Principal-Agent model presented above. The agent’s prob-
lem is standard in stochastic optimal control of SDEs, with Hamiltonian
HA(t, x, e, p, q, s) := p · f (t, x, e) + q · σ(t, x)− u(t, x, e, s). (3.5)
Therefore, by Theorem 2.1 we have for any optimal pair (x¯(·), e¯(·)) of the Agent’s
problem the existence of a pair of adjoint processes (p(·), q(·)) solving the BSDE:{
dp(t) = −{ fx(t, x¯(t), e¯(t))p(t)+ σx(t, x¯(t))q(t)− ux(t, x¯(t), e¯(t))} dt+ q(t)dWt,
p(T) = −vx(x¯(T)),
(3.6)
for which
e¯(t) = argmax
e∈E
HA(t, x¯(t), e, p(t), q(t), s(t)), (3.7)
for a.e. t ∈ [0, T] and P-a.s.
In many applications relation (3.7) is sufficient in order to find a closed form ex-
pression for e¯(t) directly, but not always. Before proceeding to the Principal’s prob-
lem we assume such a closed form expression and write
e¯t = e
∗(t, x¯(t), p(t), q(t), s(t)),
where e∗ : R+ × R4 → R is a function having sufficient regularity to allow for
existence of a unique solution to the FBSDE (3.8) below.
Remark 3.3. In the above formulation the agent is reacting to a cash-flow s(·) given
solely as anFt-adapted process s : [0, T]×Ω → S. Thus the more refined structure
of s, for instance its dependence of x, is unknown to the agent. The case in which
s is given as a function of output is briefly discussed in Section 5.
Remark 3.4. The precise regularity theory of e∗ following from the general setup
of the Agent’s problem is rather involved. In particular, consider the special case
when: v(x) ≡ 0, u ∈ C3, uee(·) > 0, u(·, e)/|e| ≥ γ(e)where γ(e)→ ∞ as |e| → ∞,
u(·) ≥ −c1 and u(·)|e=0 ≤ c1 for a suitable constant c1, |ux(·)| ≤ c2u(·) + c3 for
suitable constants c2 and c3, and |ue(·)| ≤ C(R) whenever |e| ≤ R for suitable
C(R). Then e∗ is aMarkov control policy, i.e. a continuous function in all variables,
being Lipschitz continuous on discs and of linear growth in x (see e.g. [FS93],
Theorem 11.1 p. 206).
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Based on the information given by e∗ the principal wishes to minimize the cost
JP by selecting a process s(·) respecting (3.4). The dynamics of the corresponding
control problem is, in contrast to the simple SDE of the agent’s problem, a FBSDE
built up by the output SDE coupled to the agent’s adjoint BSDE. More precisely:

dx¯t = f (t, x¯(t), e∗(t, x¯(t), p(t), q(t), s(t)))dt+ σ(t, x¯(t))dWt,
dp(t) = −{ fx(t, x¯(t), e∗(t, x¯(t), p(t), q(t), s(t)))p(t)+ σx(t, x¯(t))q(t)
−ux(t, x¯(t), e∗(t, x¯(t), p(t), q(t), s(t)))}dt+ q(t)dWt,
x¯(0) = 0, p(T) = −vx(x¯(T)).
(3.8)
Since the participation constraint (3.4) is closed and convex (i.e. the constraint set
{x ∈ R : x ≤ W0} is closed and convex) we can, under suitable regularity of the
coefficients in (3.8), apply Theorem 2.5 to characterize optimality in the Principal’s
problem. Therefore, with the Hamiltonian of the principal given by
HP(t, x, p, q, s, R, P,Q, λP, λA) :=
−R · { fx(t, x, e∗(t, x, p, q, s))p+ σx(t, x)q− ux(t, x, e∗(t, x, p, q, s))}
+P · f (t, x, e∗(t, x, p, q, s)) +Q · σ(t, x)− λAu(t, x, e∗(t, x, p, q, s))
−λPU (t, x, s),
(3.9)
we have for any optimal 4-tuple (x¯(·), p¯(·), q¯(·), s¯(·)) of the Principal’s problem
the existence of Lagrange multipliers λA, λP ∈ R satisfying
λP ≥ 0, λ2A + λ2P = 1,
and a triple of adjoint processes (R(·), P(·),Q(·)) solving the FBSDE:

dRt =
{[
∂p fx(t, x¯(t), e∗(t, x¯(t), p¯(t), q¯(t), s¯(t)))p(t)
+ fx(t, x¯(t), e∗(t, x¯(t), p¯(t), q¯(t), s¯(t)))
−∂pux(t, x¯(t), e∗(t, x¯(t), p¯(t), q¯(t), s¯(t)), s¯(t))
] · Rt
−∂p f (t, x¯(t), e∗(t, x¯(t), p¯(t), q¯(t), s¯(t))) · P(t)
+λA∂pu(t, x¯(t), e
∗(t, x¯(t), p¯(t), q¯(t), s¯(t)), s¯(t))
}
dt
+
{[
∂q fx(t, x¯(t), e∗(t, x¯(t), p¯(t), q¯(t), s¯(t))) p¯(t) + σx(t, x¯(t))
−∂qux(t, x¯(t), e∗(t, x¯(t), p¯(t), q¯(t), s¯(t)), s¯(t))
] · Rt
−∂q f (t, x¯(t), e∗(t, x¯(t), p¯(t), q¯(t), s¯(t))) · P(t)
+λA∂qu(t, x¯(t), e
∗(t, x¯(t), p¯(t), q¯(t), s¯(t)), s¯(t))
}
dWt,
dP(t) = −{− [∂x fx(t, x¯(t), e∗(t, x¯(t), p¯(t), q¯(t), s¯(t))) p¯(t) + σxx(t, x¯(t))q¯(t)
−∂xux(t, x¯(t), e∗(t, x¯(t), p¯(t), q¯(t), s¯(t)), s¯(t))] · Rt
+∂x f (t, x¯(t), e∗(t, x¯(t), p¯(t), q¯(t), s¯(t)) · P(t) + σx(t, x¯(t)) ·Q(t)
−λA∂xu(t, x¯(t), e∗(t, x¯(t), p¯(t), q¯(t), s¯(t)), s¯(t))− λPUx(t, x¯(t), s(t))} dt
+Q(t)dWt,
R(0) = 0, P(T) = vxx(x¯(T))R(T)− λAvx(x¯(T))− λPVx(x¯(T)),
(3.10)
so that
s¯(t) = argmax
s∈S
HP(t, x¯(t), p¯(t), q¯(t), s, R(t), P(t),Q(t), λP, λA),
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a.e. t ∈ [0, T], P-a.s. The notation ∂z in (3.10) means the total derivative with
respect to variable z. We are now ready to state a full characterization of optimal
contracts in the Hidden Contract Principal-Agent problem. Before doing so we
introduce the following technical assumption:
(PA): All functions involved in the Agent’s problem satisfy the conditions
(S1)-(S3) from Section 2. The functions defining the Principal’s problem
(including composition with themap e∗) satisfy the conditions (SC1)-(SC3),
also from Section 2.
Theorem 3.5 (HiddenContract Optimality Characterization). Let the regularity con-
ditions in (PA) hold and consider a Principal-Agent problem under Hidden Contracts in
continuous time with participation constraint defined by W0 < 0. Then, if (e¯(·), s¯(·)) is
an optimal contract there exist numbers λA, λP ∈ R such that
λP ≥ 0, λ2A + λ2P = 1,
a pair (p(·), q(·)) ∈ L2F (0, T;R)× (L2F (0, T;R)) solving the SDE in (3.6) and a triple
(R(·), P(·),Q(·)) ∈ L2F (Ω;C([0, T];R))× L2F(Ω;C([0, T];R))× L2F(0, T;R) solving
the FBSDE in (3.10) such that, sequentially,
e¯(t) = argmax
e∈E
HA(t, x¯(t), e, p(t), q(t), s(t)),
and
s¯(t) = argmax
s∈S
HP(t, x¯(t), p¯(t), q¯(t), s, R(t), P(t),Q(t), λP, λA),
with HamiltoniansHA andHP as in (3.5) and (3.9) respectively.
Remark 3.6. The regularity conditions in (PA) may indeed seem too restrictive for
most applications. It is, however, important to remember that the purpose of (PA)
is to ensure unique solvability of all stochastic differential equations involved in
the general setting. An alternative way of formulating Theorem 3.5 is therefore to
exchange (PA) by simply assuming the existence and uniqueness of solutions to
(3.6) and (3.10).
3.2. Hidden Action in the weak formulation. Turning to the classical theory of
Principal-Agent problems under Hidden Action we now assume the information
available to the principal to be strictly contained in the filtration generated by out-
put Fx. The set of admissible cash-flows therefore has to be redefined in compari-
son with Section 3.1 to the subset Sx[0, T] ⊂ S [0, T], where
Sx[0, T] := {s : [0, T]×Ω → S; s is F xt -adapted}. (3.11)
A direct approach (in the spirit of Section 3.1 for the Hidden Contract model) is
not mathematically tractable in the Agent’s problem, and so far no author has been
able to carry this through. Therefore, in line with [CZ13] and [Wil13] we make the
problem tractable via weak solutions of SDEs. First we model the output as{
dx(t) = σ(t, x(t))dWt,
x(0) = 0,
(3.12)
where we assume that σ > 0 and E
[∫ t
0 σ(t, x(t))
2dt
]
< ∞. We then consider the
process Γe(t) which solves the SDE{
dΓe(t) = Γe(t) f (t, x(t), e(t))σ−1(t, x(t))dWt,
Γe(0) = 0,
(3.13)
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where e(·) is the effort of the agent and f (t, x, e) is as in the previous section. Note
that Γe = E (Y) where Y(t) = ∫ t0 f (s, x(s), e(s)) · σ−1(s, x(s))dWs and E (·) denotes
the Dolean’s stochastic exponential. The key idea behind the weak formulation
of the Hidden Action model is to let the agent control the density of output Γe(t)
rather than the output process itself, and to consider (x)T as a fixed but random
realization (actually Fx = F as a consequence of the regularity of σ). Indeed,
assuming e.g. Novikov’s condition for Γe we have by Girsanov’s theorem that the
probability measure dPe defined by
dPe
dP
= Γe(T) (3.14)
makes the processWe(t) defined by
dWet = dWt − f (t, x(t), e(t))σ−1(t, x(t))dt (3.15)
a Pe-Brownian motion. In particular
dx(t) = f (t, x(t), e(t))dt+ σ(t, x(t))dWet (3.16)
and
JA(e(·); s) = Ee
[∫ T
0 u(t, x(t), e(t), s(t))dtv(x(T))
]
=
= E
[∫ T
0 Γ
e(t)u(t, x(t), e(t), s(t))dt+ Γe(T)v(x(T))
]
.
(3.17)
In the weak formulation of the Hidden Action model the Agent’s- and the Princi-
pal’s problems are formulated as follows.
The Agent’s problem (weak formulation): Given any s(·) ∈ Sx [0, T] (fulfilling
the participation constraint) the Agent’s problem is to find a process e¯(·) ∈ E [0, T]
such that cost functional is
JA(e¯(·); s) = E
[∫ T
0
Γe(t)u(t, x(t), e(t), s(t))dt+ Γe(T)v(x(T))
]
,
is minimized, subject to the dynamics in (3.13).
The Principal’s problem (strong formulation): Given that the Agent’s problem
has an optimal solution e¯(·) in the weak formulation the Principal’s problem is to
find a process s¯(·) ∈ S [0, T], such that the cost functional
JP(s¯(·)) := JP(s(·)) := E
[∫ T
0
U (t, x(t), s(t))dt+ V(x(t))
]
is minimized and
JA(e¯(·); s¯) = E
[∫ T
0
u(t, x(t), e(t), s(t))dt+ v(x(T))
]
≤ W0.
subject to the dynamics{
dx(t) = σ(t, x(t))dWt, t ∈ (0, T],
x(0) = 0.
Remark 3.7. Here we have chosen to formulate the Principal’s problem in the
strong form rather than in the weak form, which seems to be most common in
the literature. However, as pointed out in [CZ13], due to adaptivity this approach
can be problematic in certain models. A fact that one should be aware of.
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With the full Principal-Agent problem stated as above we can apply the same
technique for solving the Hidden Action case as we did with the Hidden Contract
case. However, since the control variable e figures in the diffusion coefficient of
(3.13) we require the following convexity assumption in order to avoid the second
order adjoint processes in the maximum principle:
Assumtion 1: The set E ⊂ R is convex.
The Agent’s Hamiltonian in the weak formulation is
HA(t, x, Γe, e, p, q, s) := q · Γe · f (t, x, e)σ(t, x) − Γ
e · u(t, x, e, s), (3.18)
and by Theorem 2.1 any optimal control e¯(t) solving the Agent’s problem must
maximise HA where the pair (p(·), q(·)) solves the Agent’s adjoint BSDE:
{
dp(t) = −
{
q(t) · f (t,x(t),e¯(t))
σ(t,x(t))
− u(t, x(t), e¯(t), s(t))
}
dt+ q(t)dWt,
p(T) = −v(x(T)) (3.19)
If the functions f and u both are differentiable in the e variable and we assume
that e¯(·) ∈ int(E), maximizingHA translates into the first order condition
q(t) = σ(t, x(t)) · ue(t, x(t), e¯(t), s(t))
fe(t, x(t), e¯(t))
, (3.20)
which is in agreement with [Wil13].
Just as in the Hidden Contract case we now proceed into the Principal’s prob-
lem by assuming the existence of a closed form expression for optimal effort e¯t =
e∗(t, x(t), q(t), s(t)) (having sufficient regularity to allow for existence and unique-
ness of a solution to (3.21)). The Principal is facing the problem of minimizing the
cost functional JP by controlling the following FBSDE:


dx(t) = σ(t, x(t))dWt,
dp(t) = −
{
q(t) · f (t,x(t),e∗(t,x(t),q(t),s(t)))
σ(t,x(t))
− u(t, x(t), e∗(t, x(t), q(t), s(t)), s(t))
}
dt
+q(t)dWt,
x(0) = 0, p(T) = −v(x(T)).
(3.21)
We now apply Theorem 2.5 in order to characterize optimal cash-flows in the Prin-
cipal’s problem. The associated Hamiltonian reads
HP(t, x, q, s, R, P,Q, λP, λA) := R ·
{
−q · f (t,x,e∗(t,x,q,s))
σ(t,x)
+ u(t, x, e∗(t, x, q, s), s)
}
+Q · σ(t, x)− λA · u(t, x, e∗(t, x, q, s), s)− λP · U (t, x, s),
(3.22)
and for any optimal 4-tuple (x¯(·), p¯(·), q¯(·), s¯(·))we have the existence of Lagrange
multipliers λA, λP ∈ R satisfying (3.1) and a triple of processes (R(·), P(·),Q(·))
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solving the adjoint FBSDE:

dR(t) =
{[
f (t, x(t), e∗(t, x(t), q(t), s(t)))+ q(t) · ∂q f (t, x(t), e∗(t, x(t), q(t), s(t)))
σ(t, x(t))
+∂qu(t, x(t), e∗(t, x(t), q(t), s(t)), s(t))
]
· R(t)
+λA∂qu(t, x(t), e
∗(t, x(t), q(t), s(t)), s(t))
}
dWt
dP(t) = −
{[
q(t) · ∂x f (t, x(t), e
∗(t, x(t), q(t), s(t))) · σ(t, x(t))
σ(t, x(t))2
−q(t) · f (t, x(t), e
∗(t, x(t), q(t), s(t))) · σx(t, x(t))
σ(t, x(t))2
+∂xu(t, x(t), e∗(t, x(t), q(t), s(t)), s(t))
]
· R(t) + σx(t, x(t)) ·Q(t)
−λA∂xu(t, x(t), e∗(t, x(t), q(t), s(t)), s(t))− λPUx(t, x(t), s(t))
}
dt
+Q(t)dWt
R(0) = 0, P(T) = (R(T)− λA) · vx(x(T))− λPVx(x(T))
(3.23)
We are now ready to state the full characterization of optimal contracts in the Hid-
den Action case in line with Theorem 3.5.
Theorem 3.8. Let the regularity conditions in (PA) hold and consider a Principal-Agent
problem under Hidden Actions in continuous time with participation constraint defined
by W0 < 0. Then, if (e¯(·), s¯(·)) is an optimal contract there exist numbers λA, λP ∈ R
such that
λP ≥ 0, λ2A + λ2P = 1,
a pair (p(·), q(·)) ∈ L2F (0, T;R)× (L2F (0, T;R)) solving the SDE in (3.19) and a triple
(R(·), P(·),Q(·)) ∈ L2F (Ω;C([0, T];R))× L2F(Ω;C([0, T];R))× L2F(0, T;R) solving
the FBSDE in (3.23) such that, sequentially,
e¯(t) = argmax
e∈E
HA(t, x¯(t), Γe(t), e, p(t), q(t), s(t)),
and
s¯(t) = argmax
s∈S
HP(t, x¯(t), q¯(t), s, R(t), P(t),Q(t), λP, λA),
with HamiltoniansHA andHP as in (3.18) and (3.22) respectively.
3.3. Conclusion. In this sectionwe have studied two differentmodels of Principal-
Agent type. The first model, referred to as the Hidden Contract model, is to the
best of our knowledge new whereas the second model of Hidden Action in the
weak formulation is by now well known. We believe that our contribution to the
existing literature is of interest for two reasons:
• The Hidden Contract model is indeed deviating from the main stream di-
rection of research in Principal-Agent problems. One of the most serious
claims against our model is probably the lack of realism since the Agent
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has to accept a hidden contract based on a cash-flow that does not neces-
sarily depend of the observed output. Since the Agent can only influence
the contract via the participation constraint he/she maywell be exposed to
undesirable high levels of risk without being aware of it. The realism in our
Hidden Contract model would therefore increase notably if the participa-
tion constraint could be extended to include also a statement of acceptable
risk, for instance by imposing that the variance of the accumulated cash-
flow is bounded from above. This will be the topic of a follow-up paper
as it requires extending the approach of Section 3 and the framework in
Section 2 to cost-functionals of mean-field type.
• The Hidden Action case in the weak formulation as stated above does not
add any significant contribution to the existing theory. As mentioned in
the Introduction our approach is closest to the one in [Wil13] since both
use stochastic generalizations of Pontryagin’s maximum principle to char-
acterize optimality. The main difference compared to [Wil13] is that we ex-
ploit thesemethods to find a full characterization covering both the Agent’s
and the Principal’s problem, and not only that of the Agent.
The book [CZ13] presents a thorough characterization of the Hidden
Action model, adopting the convention of keeping the weak formulation
also for the Principal’s problem. The solution scheme is then carried through
via a well known technique in stochastic optimization which is slightly
different from our approach. However, since our next step is to consider
Principal-Agent problems involving nonlinear cost functionals such as vari-
ance we believe that the method described in Section 3.2 is more suitable.
4. A SOLVED EXAMPLE
To illustrate the method described in Section 3 we devote this section to solve
a concrete example of the Hidden Contract Principal-Agent problem in a linear-
quadratic (LQ)-setting. It turns out that closed form solutions of both the optimal
effort e¯(t) and the optimal cash-flow s¯(t) can be found. Consider the following
dynamics of production,{
dx(t) = (ax(t) + be(t))dt+ σdWt, t ∈ (0, T],
x(0) = 0, a, b ∈ R and σ > 0,
and let the preferences of the agent and the principal be described by quadratic
utility functions as:
JA(e(·); s) := E
[∫ T
0
(st − et)2
2
dt− α · x(T)
2
2
]
, (4.1)
JP(s(·)) := E
[∫ T
0
s2t
2
dt− β · x(T)
2
2
]
. (4.2)
Note that we are following the convention of Section 3 and consider cost- rather
than payoff-functionals. Thus, the Agent’s utility function should be interpreted
as a desire to maintain a level of effort close to the compensation given by the
cash-flow. We think of the parameters α > 0 and β > 0 as bonus factors of total
production at time T. For the participation constraint we require any admissible
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cash-flow s(t) to satisfy
JA(e¯(·); s) ≤ W0, W0 < 0, (4.3)
where e¯(·) denotes the optimal response of the agent given s(t).
Assume that the principal offers the agent s(t) over the period 0 ≤ t ≤ T. The
Hamiltonian function of the agent’s problem is
HA(x, e, p, q, s) := p · (ax+ be) + q · σ− (s− e)
2
2
,
so
∂HA
∂e
= bp+ s− e = 0 and e¯(t) = bp(t) + s(t), (4.4)
where the pair (p, q) solves the adjoint equation{
dp(t) = −ap(t)dt+ q(t)dWt,
p(T) = αx(T).
Turning now to the principal’s problem we would like to control the FBSDE

dx(t) = (ax(t)− b2p(t) + bs(t))dt+ σdWt,
dp(t) = −ap(t)dt+ q(t)dWt,
x(0) = 0, p(T) = αx(T).
(4.5)
optimally by s with respect to (4.2) under the state constraint in (4.3) that now,
given the optimal effort e¯ in (4.4), reads JA(bp(·) + s(·)) ≤ W0. Thus the Hamil-
tonian function of this problem is given by
HP(x, p, q, s, P,Q, R, λA, λP) :=
= P · (ax+ b2p+ bs)− R · ap+Q · σ− λA · b
2p2
2 − λP · s
2
2 ,
where λA and λP are Lagrange-multipliers such that λP ≥ 0 and λ2P + λ2A = 1,
according to Theorem 2.5 in Section 2. Again we easily find the unique candidate
for optimal control:
∂HP
∂s
= bP− λPs, so s¯(t) = b
λP
P(t)
where the triple (R(t), P(t),Q(t)) solves the adjoint FBSDE:

dR(t) = (aR(t)− b2P(t) + λab2p(t))dt,
dP(t) = −aP(t)dt+Q(t)dWt,
R(0) = 0, P(T) = −αR(T) + (αλA + βλP)x(T).
(4.6)
In order to find concrete expressions for the controls (e¯t, s¯t) in the optimal contract
we must solve the BSDEs in (4.5) and (4.6). For this we consider a general ansatz
of feedback type
p(t) = ϕ(t, x(t), R(t)), and P(t) = ψ(t, x(t), R(t))
and compute the stochastic differentials by utilizing Itoˆ’s lemma. We get
dp(t) = dϕ(t, x(t), R(t)) ={
∂tϕ+ (ax(t) + b2ϕ+
b2
λP
ψ)ϕx + (aR(t) + λAb
2ϕ− b2ψ)ϕy + σ22 ϕxx
}
+ σϕxdWt,
dP(t) = dψ(t, x(t), Rt) ={
∂tψ+ (ax(t) + b2ϕ+
b2
λP
ψ)ψx + (aRt + λAb
2ϕ− b2ψ)ψy + σ22 ψxx
}
dt+ σψxdWt.
THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEM 21
By identifying coefficients in the equations we end up with the following system
of semilinear parabolic PDE’s:

∂tϕ+ aϕ+ (ax(t) + b2ϕ+
b2
λP
ψ)ϕx + (aRt + λAb
2ϕ− b2ψ)ϕy + σ22 ϕxx = 0,
∂tψ+ aψ+ (ax(t) + b2ϕ+
b2
λP
ψ)ψx + (aRt + λAb
2ϕ− b2ψ)ψy + σ22 ψxx = 0,
ϕ(T, x, y) = αx,ψ(T, x, y) = −αy+ (αλa + βλP)x,
a, b, λA, λP ∈ R, α ∈ (0, 1), σ > 0, λP ≥ 0, λ2P + λ2A = 1.
(4.7)
This system is of course in general very difficult or even impossible to solve ex-
plicitly, but a numerical scheme like for instance finite differences would handle
the problem well. However, in this case we may proceed analytically a bit further
by considering yet another ansatz:
ϕ(t, x, y) = C1(t)x+ C2(t)y, ψ(t, x, y) = D1(t)x+ D2(t)y.
By identifying coefficients, this ansatz reduces (4.7) to a terminal conditioned Riccati-
system:

dC1
dt = 2aC1(t) + b
2C21(t) +
b2
λP
C1(t)D1(t)− b2C2(t)D1(t) + λAb2C1(t)C2(t),
dC2
dt = 2aC2(t) + λAb
2C22(t)− b2C2(t)D2(t) + b
2
λP
C1(t)D2(t) + b
2C1(t)C2(t),
dD1
dt = 2aD1(t) +
b2
λP
D21(t) + b
2C1(t)D1(t) + λAb
2C1(t)D2(t)− b2D1(t)D2(t),
dD2
dt = 2aD2(t)− b2D22(t) + λAb2C2(t)D2(t) + b2D1(t)C2(t) + b
2
λP
D1(t)D2(t),
C1(T) = α, C2(T) = 0, D1(T) = αλA + βλP, D2(T) = −α.
(4.8)
Riccati-systems have closed form solutions only in exceptional cases and the one
in (4.8) is too general to admit such (even though the coefficients are constant). A
good theoretical treatment of Riccati-systems and matrix Riccati equations can be
found in [AKFIJ03].
Even though an explicit solution seems hopeless, it is an easy task to solve
(4.8) numerically, given the parameters. An example is presented in Fig. 1 be-
low. Hence, for the LQ Principal-Agent we get the unique semi-explicit optimal
contract as
{e¯(t), s¯(t)} =
= {(D1(t) + bC1(t))x¯(t) + (D2(t) + bC2(t))R¯(t), bλPD1(t)x¯t + bλP D2(t)R¯(t)}
(4.9)
where the optimal dynamics (x¯(t), R¯(t)) solve the forward SDE’s in (4.5) and (4.6),
replacing p(t) and P(t) by ϕ(t, x¯(t), R¯(t)) and ψ(t, ¯x(t), R¯(t)). What still remains is
to find a feasible pair (λA, λP) so that the optimal contract fulfills the participation
constraint in (4.3). One way of finding such a pair is for instance by stochastic sim-
ulation of (x¯(t), R¯(t)) (e.g. a simple Euler-Maruyama scheme) and then estimate
the payoff in (4.3) by Monte-Carlo techniques for different values of λP. In Fig. 2
below we have included the results of such a scheme where the negative expected
payoff for the agent and the principal are plotted as functions of the multiplier λP.
Note that R¯(t) satisfies the linear ODE{
dR
dt + (b
2D2(t)− λAb2C2(t)− a)R(t) = (λAb2C1(t)− b2D1(t))x¯(t)
R(0) = 0,
(4.10)
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√
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FIGURE 2. Monte-Carlo simulations of JA(e¯(·); s¯) and JP(s¯(·))
as functions of λP based on 5 · 105 sample paths at each point.
Parameter values: a = b = σ = 1, α = 0.2, β = 1, T = 0.35. Blue
signifies the branch λA > 0 whereas green is the branch λA < 0.
so
R(t) =
∫ t
0 exp
{∫ s
0 b
2D2(u)− λAb2C2(u)− a du
} · (λAb2C1(s)− b2D1(s))x¯(t)ds
exp
{∫ t
0 b
2D2(s)− λAb2C2(s)− a ds
} ,
and is by that Fx-adapted. Therefore, in this model the optimal contract (4.9) is
Fx-adapted and coincides with the corresponding strong solution to the Hidden
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Action problem, i.e. when the information set of the Principal is generated by out-
put.
An interesting observation to make from the numerical result is the mono-
tonic nature of the agents negative payoff. Apparently JA(e¯(·); s¯)) is a decreas-
ing function of λA ∈ (−1, 1) ranging over the entire half-axis (−∞, 0), meaning
that the agent increases his/her expected final utility by an increased value of λA.
In contrast, the function JP(s¯(·)) is a non-monotonic function of λA ∈ (−1, 1)
but does increase on each of the branches −1 < λA ≤ 0 and 0 ≤ λA < 1
(considering λA = 0 as the starting point). Furthermore (as suggested by the
numerics) the negative branch is strictly below the positive one. Thus, for any
W0 ∈ (Wc, 0] whereWc := JA(e¯(·); s¯)|λA=0 and corresponding multiplier λ0A such
that JA(e¯(·); s¯)|λA=λ0A = W0 we have that{
JA(e¯(·); s¯)|λA=0 < W0,JP(s¯(·))|λA=0 < JP(s¯(·))|λA=λ0A ,
meaning that both parts will benefit from a contract offering the agent higher ex-
pected utility than the minimal threshold −W0. This implication is somewhat
counterintuitive since it would be reasonable to expect the optimal contract to ful-
fill the equality
JA(e¯(·); s¯) = W0. (4.11)
Indeed, in the case of lump-sum paying contracts with separable utility functions
the relation (4.11) is proven in [CWZ09] in a continuous time setting. The effects
suggested above therefore reveal an interesting additional complexity in optimal
contracting with non-separable utility functions and continuously paying cash-
flows. To the best of our knowledge this has not been observed in the present liter-
ature. It has in fact rather conjectured false in the setting considered in [CWZ09].
5. A VIEW TOWARDS HIDDEN ACTIONS IN THE STRONG FORMULATION
So far in our presentation of the Principal-Agent problem under Hidden Action
we have been working under the crucial assumption that the Agent is facing a
stochastic optimal control problem in the weak sense. However, from the point of
view of applications it is probablymore natural to consider the strong formulation
in which the the agents controls output rather than the density of output. This
problem is much more difficult and we devote this section to a case study, only to
give a glimpse of the type of difficulties that may arise. We also present a possible
direction for future research in this area.
Just as in Section 3 we consider a hidden action Principal-Agent model where
the output x(t) is a risky asset solving the SDE{
dx(t) = f (t, x(t), e(t))dt+ σ(t, x(t))dWt, t ∈ (0, T],
x(0) = 0,
(5.1)
and the cost functionals are of the form
JA(e(·); s) := E
[∫ T
0
u(t, x(t), e(t), s(t, x(t)))dt+ v(x(t))
]
, (5.2)
and
JP(s(·)) := E
[∫ T
0
U (t, x(t), s(t))dt+ V(x(t))
]
. (5.3)
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The principal wishes to find an optimal contract (e¯(·), s¯(·)) solving the Principal-
Agent problem by tailoring a differentiable (in x) map (t, x) 7→ s(t, x), i.e. a
’smooth’ cash-flow of feed-back type. Compared to Section 3 essential differences
now arise already in the Agent’s problem. For instance the agent’s BSDE takes the
form

dp(t) = −{ fx(t, x¯(t), e¯(t))p(t) + σx(t, x¯(t))q(t)− ∂xu(t, x¯(t), e¯(t), s(t, x(t)))}dt
+q(t)dWt,
p(T) = −vx(x¯(T)),
and the Hamiltonian is
HA(t, x, e, p, q, s) := p · f (t, x, e) + q · σ(t, x)− u(t, x, e, s(t, x)).
The extra dependence on x(t) appearing in these equations may seem harmless,
but it actually complicates the problem substantially. Having the additional infor-
mation of how the cash-flow s(·) depends on the output makes it possible for the
agent to select optimal effort more carefully by estimating future dividends of the
contract. Loosely speaking this yields a path dependence of s(·) in e¯(·), turning
the Principal’s problem into a non-standard stochastic optimal control problem. In
order to illustrate this we consider an explicit example.
Example 5.1. Consider the dynamics governing output as{
dx(t) = e(t)dt+ σdWt,
x(0) = 0
and cost functionals
JA(e(·); s) := E
[∫ T
0
e(t)2
2
− s(t, x(t))dt
]
(5.4)
and
JP(s(·)) := E
[∫ T
0
s(t)dt− x(T)
]
. (5.5)
We let the participation constraint be as in (4.3) and consider the Agent’s problem.
Clearly
HA(t, x, e, p, q, s) := p · e+ q · σ−
(
e2
2
− s(t, x)
)
so
∂HA
∂e
= p− e = 0 and e¯t = p(t)
where (p(·), q(·)) solves the BSDE{
dp(t) = −sx(t, x(t))dt+ q(t)dWt,
p(T) = 0.
(5.6)
In order to solve (5.6) we consider the ansatz p(t) = ϕ(t, x(t)), for a smooth func-
tion ϕ, and apply Itoˆ’s lemma so that
dp(t) =
{
∂tϕ(t, x(t)) + ϕ(t, x(t))ϕx(t, x(t)) +
σ2
2
ϕxx(t, x(t))
}
dt+σϕx(t, x(t))dWt
Thus, by identifying coefficients we get the equation{
∂tϕ(t, x) + ϕ(t, x)ϕx(t, x) +
σ2
2 ϕxx(t, x) + sx(t, x) = 0,
ϕ(T, x) = 0,
(5.7)
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i.e. Burger’s equation with force term sx. Despite the non-linear nature of this PDE
it admits an explicit solution via the so called Hopf-Cole transformation
ϕ(t, x) =
∂
∂x
[
σ2logv(t, x)
]
,
where v(t, x) solves the inhomogeneous heat equation{
∂tv(t, x) = − σ22 vxx(t, x)− s(t, x),
v(T, x) = exp
(
1
σ2
∫
ϕ(T, x)dx
)
= 1.
(5.8)
By time-reversal we turn (5.8) into an initial value problem and thereby find the
solution to (5.7) as
ϕ(t, x, s.) = σ
2
∫ T
t
∫
R
ξ−x
σ2(τ−t)G(x, ξ, τ− t)s(τ, ξ)dξdτ
1+
∫ T
t
∫
R
G(x, ξ, τ− t)s(τ, ξ)dξdτ
, (5.9)
where G(x, ξ, τ− t) is the Gauss-kernel
G(x, ξ, τ− t) := 1√
2πσ2(τ − t)exp
{
− (ξ − x)
2
2σ2(τ− t)
}
.
We use the notation ’s.’ in (5.9) to underline the functional dependence of the func-
tion s(·) in the solution ϕ.
It is easy to check that if s(t, x) = C for some constant C > 0, then e¯t = ϕ(t, x(t)) ≡ 0,
which of course is to expect. Another interesting example is to take s(t, x) = x,
making the optimal effort non-trivial:
e¯(t) =
σ2(T − t)
1+ x(t)(T− t) .
Having e¯(t) = ϕ(t, x(t)) the Principal’s problem is to control{
dx(t) = ϕ(t, x(t), s.)dt+ σdWt,
x(0) = 0,
(5.10)
optimally by minimizing the cost functional (5.5), yet respecting the participation
constraint
JA(ϕ(·); s.) = E
[∫ T
0
ϕ(t, x(t), s.)2
2
− s(t, x(t))dt
]
< W0,
for some given W0 < 0. The main obstacle as compared to the general theory
in Section 3 is the dependence of s(·) in (5.10) now being functional rather than
point-wise. To handle this one could for instance consider the probability density
function µ(t, z) of x(t) at time t ≥ 0. Since (5.10) is an Itoˆ-process with initial
condition x(0) = 0 we know that µ(t, z) solves the Fokker-Planck equation (or, the
Kolmogorov forward equation):{
∂
∂tµ(t, z) = − ∂∂z [ϕ(t, z, s.)µ(t, z)] + σ
2
2
∂2
∂z2
µ(t, z)
µ(t, z) = δ0
(5.11)
Having µ(t, z) at hand the Principal’s problem can now be formulated as a deter-
ministic problem in optimal control of PDEs. More precisely, the principal wishes
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to find a function s(t, x) (lying in a suitable function space making (5.11) well-
posed) minimizing the functional
JP(s(·)) =
∫ T
0
∫
R
s(t, z)µ(t, z)dzdt−
∫
R
zµ(T, z)dz
subject to the constraint
JA(ϕ(·); s.) =
∫ T
0
∫
R
(
ϕ(t, z, s.)2
2
− s(t, z)
)
µ(t, z)dzdt < W0.
This problem, however, goes beyond the scope of our presentation and we leave
it for a future study. In [AB10] and recently in [ABNT14] the authors explore the
general possibility of the above approach to stochastic optimal control, thus for-
mulating the problem in terms of optimal control of the Fokker-Planck equation.
Their setting is, however, significantly different from ours in that it does not allow
for a functional dependence of the control in (5.11).
APPENDIX A. TECHNICAL THEOREMS
The main result upon which the proof of Theorem 2.5 relies is the following
well-known theorem by Ekeland (see e.g. [YZ99], Lemma 6.2 p. 145).
Theorem A.1 (Ekeland’s variational principle). Let (V, d) be a complete metric space
and let F : V → (−∞,∞] be a proper (i.e. F ≡ +∞), lower semicontinuous function
bounded from below. Let v0 ∈ D := {v ∈ V|F(v) < ∞} and let λ > 0 be fixed. Then
there exists a v¯ ∈ V such that:
(i): F(v¯) + λd(v¯, v0) ≤ F(v0)
(ii): F(v¯) < F(v) + λd(v, v¯), ∀v 6= v¯.
The next result is a useful consequence of Theorem A.1.
Corollary A.2. Let the assumptions of Theorem A.1 hold. Let ρ > 0 and v0 ∈ V be such
that
F(v0) ≤ inf
v∈V
F(v) + ρ.
Then there exists a vρ ∈ V such that
F(vρ) ≤ F(v0), d(vρ, v0) ≤ √ρ,
and for all v ∈ V,
−√ρd(v, vρ) ≤ F(v)− F(vρ).
In addition to Ekeland’s variational principle we also need a couple of lemmas
to prove Theorem 2.5. One dealing with a certain metric structure on the space
U [0, T], and the other explaining some regularity properties of the canonical dis-
tance function dΛ(·, ·) to a given closed and convex set Λ. Both results are pre-
sented with proofs in [YZ99] (Lemma 6.4 p. 147 and Lemma 6.5 p. 148).
Lemma A.3. Let d¯ be defined by the following:
d¯(u(·), u˜(·)) := |{(t,ω) ∈ [0, T]×Ω : u(t,ω) 6= u˜(t,ω)}|, ∀u(·), u˜(·) ∈ U [0, T],
where |A| denotes the product measure of the Lebesgue measure and the probability P of a
set A ⊆ [0, T]×Ω. Then d¯ is a metric under which U [0, T] is a complete metric space.
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Lemma A.4. Let Λ ⊆ Rl be a closed and convex set and define the distance function
dΛ(v) := inf
v′∈Λ
|v− v′|, ∀v ∈ Rl .
Then the following holds:
(i) dΛ : R
l → R is convex and Lipschitz continuos with Lipschitz constant 1.
(ii) For any v /∈ Λ, ∂dΛ(v) has exactly one element with its length being 1.
(iii) dΛ(·)2 is C1.
Here, for a region G ⊂ Rn and a locally Lipschitz continuous function φ : G →
R the Clarke’s generalized gradient ∂φ at x ∈ G is defined as
∂φ(x) :=
{
ξ ∈ Rn : 〈ξ, y〉 ≤ lim sup
z→x,z∈G,t↓0
φ(z+ ty)− φ(z)
t
}
,
which is nothing but the ordinary gradient ∇φ(x) if φ is continuously differen-
tiable at x ∈ G. Further, if φ : G → R is a convex function and the set G ⊆ Rl is
convex it is a well-known fact that ∂φ(x) for x ∈ G can be written as:
∂φ(x) = {ξ ∈ Rl |〈ξ, y〉 ≤ φ(x+ y)− φ(x), ∀y ∈ Rl , x+ y ∈ G}.
Thus, for convex functions defined over convex sets the generalized Clarke gradi-
ent coincides with the subgradient.
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